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Export Controls: Who's Policing the Enforcers?
Jere W. Morehead*
ProfessorMoreheaddemonstrates in this article that U.S. attempts to limit
exports of military technology to Soviet bloc nations routinely fail. Professor
Morehead argues that this happensprimarily because export control of strategic
goods is fragmented among the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense.
He suggests that export control should be centralized into one independent
agency. Professor Morehead notes that the 1985 amendments to the Export
AdministrationAct did not adequately address export controlproblems, nor does
the Omnibus Trade Bill.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Juvenal, SATIRES VI, 347

The announced policy of the United States is to control the export of arms, military technology, and other strategic commodities to
Soviet bloc nations and countries engaged in or supporting international terrorism.' In the wake of national attention focused on the
Reagan Administration's secret arms sales to Iran, a careful review of
U.S. export controls, as a means to prevent the diversion of strategic
technology and combat terrorism, demonstrates that they are confused, fragmented, and often contradictory.
This article will review the effectiveness of American export controls, focusing attention on the Export Administration Act as
amended in 19852 and, to a lesser extent, on the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.3 No attempt will be made to justify the existence or
breadth of such controls on business, although the ongoing debate
between experts in economics, business, national security, and foreign affairs has raised compelling issues 4 that must be resolved ultiAssistant Professor of Legal Studies and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, The
University of Georgia. Professor Morehead is a former Assistant United States Attorney in
the Department of Justice, where he prosecuted cases involving violations of American
export control laws.

1 22 U.S.C. §§ 2394(a), 2753(f) (1985); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401, 2403-1, 2404, 2405,
2405() (1985); 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1987); 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (1987).
2 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419 (Supp. I1 1985).
3 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1982).
4 The burgeoning trade deficit is alarming for the United States. The 1986 deficit
was 169.8 billion dollars, a rise of 21.3 billion over the previous year. Truell, Financingfor

Exports Grows Harderto Findfor all but the Big Firms, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at I, col. 6. In
1981 the trade deficit by comparison was only 39.8 billion dollars. Bailey & Tucker, New

Commerce DepartmentStudy Reports U.S. Imports Surged Dunng 1981-85 Period, Bus. AmER.,July
21, 1986, at 12. Recent statistics evidence no improvement in the problem. Gutfield, U.S.
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mately by the President and the Congress. 5
Instead this article seeks to expand that discussion to include the
effectiveness of export controls in curtailing the acquisition of goods
and technology by restricted countries. 6 Special attention will be
given to cases where export controls have failed to prevent the diversion and transshipment of strategic commodities to the Soviet
Union, 7 Libya, 8 and Iran. 9 Any attempt by policymakers to reconcile
the legitimate interests of business with national defense needs must
ensure that future controls will, in fact, accomplish their intended
result. This article will offer recommendations on how that may be
achieved.
I.

Historical Overview

The United States historically has applied export controls only
during wartime and other periods of national emergency.' 0 The
original source for export controls was the Trading with the Enemy
Trade Gap Widened inJuly to Record Total, Wall St.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 3, col. 1. "At 4% of
GNP, the trade deficit is unprecedented in both its size and the speed with which it grew."
Holliday & Wilson, Trade Issues: An Overview, CRS REV., Feb. 1987, at I. Over a period
from 1950-1985, the United States' share of world exports has declined from 21% to
12.6%. Murphy, Coping with Foreign-Law Impediments to the Export Licensing of United States
Technology, 20 INT'L LAW. 1129, 1131 (1986).
5 The trade versus control debate has been pervasive. See H.R. COMM. ON SCI., SPACE
& TECH., I00TH CONG., IST SESS., NAT'L ACAD. Sci. REP. ON INT'L TECH. TRANSFER 1-17
(Executive Summary 1987) [hereinafter NAT'L ACAD. Sci.]; Nollen, Business Costs and Business Policyfor Export Controls, 18J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1 (1987); Kamerschen & Robinson, An
Analysis of the Export Licensing Mechanism and Its Effect Upon the Competitiveness of U.S. High
Technology Exports, 17 AKRON Bus. & ECON. REV. 12 (1986); Zschau, Export Controls and
America's Competitive Challenge, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1986); Overly, Regulation of Critical Technologies Under the Export AdministrationAct of 1979 and the ProposedExport Administration Amendments of 1983: American Business Versus National Security, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 423
(1985).
Members of the House-Senate conference are struggling to resolve the trade dispute
as they attempt to reconcile differences between the two bodies over the omnibus trade
bill. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2981 (1987) (passed House on Apr.
30, 1987); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 10,372 (1987) (passed Senate as
amended onJuly 21, 1987). Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3 are designed to
retaliate against certain unfair trade practices by foreign countries while attempting to
boost exports abroad. The highlights and differences between the two versions are described in considerable detail in H.R. 3, OMNIBUS TRADE & COMPETITIVENESS LEGISLATION,
100th CONG., 2d SESS., COMPARISON OF HOUSE & SENATE PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 1987).
6 See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
7 MRI/Mueller: Vax Case, Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-783, at 63-65
(1984) (statement of William Rudman, Director, Strategic Investigations Division, U.S.
Customs Service); I.B.M. Germany Case, Rasky and Sanger, U.S. Split Over Computer Sales to
a Soviet-Owned Co., N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at I, col. 1.
8 United States v. Elkins, No. 86-267A (N.D. Ga. indicted July 22, 1986, convicted
June 5, 1987). See infra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
9 The United States v. McTavish, No. 85-226A (N.D. Ga. indicted June 13, 1985,
convicted Jan. 17, 1986), aff'd, No. 86-8343 (Feb. 17, 1987). See infra notes 142-53 and
accompanying text.
It) Berman & Carson, United States Export Controls-Past,Present and Future, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 791, n.l (1967).
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Act of 1917.11 Beginning with World War II and continuing thereafter due to the development of Cold War tensions with the Soviet
Union, 12 export controls burgeoned.' 3 Ultimately, Congress created
the first extensive export control apparatus in peacetime with the enactment of the Export Control Act of 1949.'4 Over the course of the
next twenty years, the authority given to the President under the Act
was continually renewed 15 and strengthened' 6 to control the flow of
domestic exports.
In 1949 the United States and six allied nations also formed an
informal group to regulate exports. 17 A few years later, these same
nations formed a Coordinating Committee (COCOM)18 and a China
Committee (CHINCOM) 19 to develop, maintain, and update export
controls on strategic goods. Each member nation was responsible
20
for implementing export controls through domestic legislation.
As part of the overall Cold War policy of containing perceived
Soviet expansion, Congress subsequently passed other legislation
imposing export controls on trade with communist bloc nations.
''

50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982) (original version at ch. 106,40 Stat. 411 (1917)).

12 Berman & Garson, supra note 10, at 795-96.

13 See Comment, The Export AdministrationAct of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of the
"Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 255, 258 (1981).
"4 Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (repealed 1969).
15 H.J. Res. 197, 65 Stat. 43 (1951); Act ofJune 16, 1953, ch. 116, 67 Stat. 62; Act of
June 29, 1956, ch. 473, § 1, 70 Stat. 407,407-08; Act ofJune 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-466,
72 Stat. 220; Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-464, 74 Stat. 130; Act ofJuly 1, 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-515, § 1, 76 Star. 127, 127; Act ofJune 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 1, 79
Stat. 209, 209.
16 Berman & Garson, supra note 10, at 800-04.
17 Id. at 834-35. "A series of embargo lists was agreed upon, and a body known as
the Consultative Group, composed of export control officials of the various governments,
was set up to supervise these lists." Id. at 835.
18 Id. COCOM continues to operate today among the major western nations Uapan
and NATO countries, with the exception of Iceland). Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-929, at 157 (1982)
(statement of James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance).
COCOM is responsible for (1) establishing and updating lists of embargoed products and
technologies to proscribed countries (Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact countries,
China, and other Communist countries in Asia); (2) acting as a clearing-house for requests
submitted by member governments to export specific items to end users in proscribed
countries; and (3) serving as a means for coordinating the administration and enforcement
activities of member countries. Id.
19 Berman & Garson, supra note 10, at 835. "In 1957, the special China List was
abolished and the separate chairmanship of CHINCOM was discontinued. However,
COCOM controls now extend to Communist China and North Korea, as well as to North
Vietnam ..... Id.
20 Note, Export Licensing: UncoordinatedTrade Repression, 9 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 333,
335 (1979); Berman & Garson, supra note 10, at 835. Such legislation was unnecessary in
the United States as the existing controls were more stringent than those of COCOM.
Note, National Security Protection: The Critical Technologies Approach to U.S. Export Control of High
Level Technology, 15J. Irrr'L L. & EcON. 575, 578 (1981) [hereinafter Note, National Security
Protection].
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The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951, commonly known as the
Battle Act, 2 ' embargoed the export of arms and other strategic items
to nations threatening the security of the United States. Under the
Act, the United States denied military, economic, or financial aid to
any nation which knowingly shipped such items to prohibited countries. 22 The Mutual Security Act of 195423 authorized the President
to control, "in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States," 24 the export of military hardware
and related technical data.
In 1962 the United States intensified its domestic export controls when Congress amended the Export Control Act to deny an
export license if the export "would prove detrimental to the national
security and welfare of the United States."'2 5 By the early 1960's, a
comprehensive web of export controls was in place as a potent
weapon in the escalating Cold War.2 6 The United States sought to

prevent any trade that would contribute to the economic or military
development of countries thought to be unfriendly to the United
27
States.
Nevertheless, influenced by the advent of detente with the Soviet
Union, 28 Congress began relaxing export controls when it enacted
the Export Administration Act of 196929 and its subsequent amendments in 197430 and 1977.3' The Act declared the primary export
policy of the United States "to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States," 32 and limited
controls to the measure necessary to achieve the foregoing stated
33
declaration of policy.
21 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613 (1976), superseded by Export Administration Act of 1979,
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419 (1982).
22 Id. § 1612(b). See Note, National Security Protection, supra note 20, at 578-79.
23 Ch. 937, tit. IV § 414, 68 Stat. 848 (1954), superseded by Arms Export Control Act,

22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976).

24 Id. § 414(a).
25 Export Control Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-515, § 1, 76 Stat. 127 (1962)
(expired 1969).
26 Comment, supra note 13, at 261-62.
27 Bingham &Johnson, A RationalApproach to Export Control, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 894, 896
(1979).
28 See Note, National Security Protection, supra note 20, at 580.
29 Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (original
version at 83 Stat. 841 (1969)) superseded by Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.

app. §§ 2401-2419 (1982).
30 Export Administration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-327, 88 Stat. 287
(1974); Pub. L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1152 (1974).
31 Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(1977).
32 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1)(B).
33 For instance, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) provided:

It is the policy of the United States to use export controls (A) to the extent
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Restraining the extent of controls represented a decided change
from a more vigorous twenty year policy of "don't sell them (the
enemy) anything."13 4 Within the Act, a profound tension was evident
between two competing philosophies: one seeking the benefits of
trade and the other concerned with how that trade affects our national security and foreign policy. That seeming contradiction led to
repeated criticisms of our export licensing system as being either too
loose-helping the enemy build up their technology to the detriment
of our national security-or too strict-losing business to other
35
countries without affecting what the enemy could acquire.
Further liberalization of trade controls came with the Export
Administration Act of 1979.36 The Act completely overhauled
America's export control program. 3 7 While continuing to acknowledge that national security and foreign policy considerations necessitated the imposition of export restrictions,3 8 the Act required the
Commerce Department, as the primary bureaucratic unit charged
with overseeing export controls, to consider as well the balance of
trade and the rights of exporters in evaluating export restrictions.3 9
II. Current Export Control Laws
The United States' export control system currently is regulated
by the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, pursuant to authority provided under the Arms Export Control Act of
necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce
materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand,
(B) to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States and to fulfill its international responsibilities, and (C) to the
extent necessary to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the
standpoint of their significance to the national security of the United States.
A Library of Congress report concluded that the 1969 Act was designed to foster EastWest trade, rather than control such trade. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOREIGN ESPIONAGE &
U.S. TECHNOLOGY (1980), quoted in Transfer of U.S. High Technology to the Soviet Union & Soviet
Bloc Nations, S. REP. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1982).
34 Bingham & Johnson, supra note 27, at 896.
35 Id. at 897; NAT'L ACAD. Sci., supra note 5, at 10-11.
36 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419 (1982). A detailed explanation of the 1979 Act may
be found in Comment, supra, note 13, at 267-97.
37 Comment, supra note 13, at 255.
38 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401.
39 The 1979 Act provided that:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after full
consideration of the impact of the economy of the United States and only to
the extent necessary-(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology
which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any
other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to
the national security of the United States; (B) to restrict the export of goods
and technology where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of
the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations; and (C) to
restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious
inflationary impact of foreign demand.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2).
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197640 and the Export Administration Act, as amended in 1985.41
The Department of Defense also plays a key role in determining the
technology to be controlled 42 as does the United States Customs
43
Service in the enforcement of the controls.
A.

Export Administration Act

The Export Administration Act is the primary law regulating exports from the United States. Under the Act, it is the policy of the
United States to restrict the export of strategic goods and technology
44
on the basis of national security, foreign policy, and short supply.
The controls are implemented by the Commerce Department which
exercises export control jurisdiction over most articles, supplies, and
unpublished technical data from the United States. 4 5 The Commerce Department may issue: (1) a validated license authorizing a
specific export upon application by the exporter; 46 (2) validated
licenses authorizing multiple exports upon application by the exporter;4 7 and (3) general licenses without application by the
48
exporter.
The Commerce Department maintains a control list setting forth
the licensing restrictions for exporting strategic goods and technol40

22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). This Act replaced the Mutual Security Act of 1954, supra

note 23.
41 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419 (Supp. III 1985). When the Export Administration
Act of 1979 expired in 1983, the President issued Exec. Order No. 12,444, 48 Fed. Reg.
48,215 (1983) and Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984), under authority
contained in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1982), to continue the export control regulations promulgated under the
1979 Act. IEEPA also was utilized by the President to prohibit exports to Iran, Libya,
South Africa, and Nicaragua. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980); Exec. Order No.
12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985);
Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986). For a plain and intelligible introduction
to the Act and accompanying regulations see Gerwin, An Introduction to U.S. Export Control
Laws, 32 PRAc. LAw. 25 (1986).
42 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403-1, 2409(g); 22 C.F.R. § 120.2 (1987). The House version
of H.R. 3 contains provisions limiting the Defense Department review of license applications to exports to controlled countries. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332(n) (1987).
Both versions provide that if the Secretary of Defense does not respond to a license referred within twenty days, the Secretary of Commerce may make a determination on an
application at his own discretion. Id. (House version); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1021 (Senate version).
43 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411; 22 C.F.R. § 127.4; 50 Fed. Reg. 41,545 (1985).
44 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2).
45 Id. §§ 2403-2406. Although the Department of Commerce is under a statutory
duty, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413, to provide annual reports to Congress on the
implementation of these controls not later than December 31 for the preceding fiscal year,
no annual reports have been issued by the Commerce Department more current than fiscal
year 1984. Telephone conversation with Bonnie Grist, Aide to U.S. Rep. Douglas Barnard, Sept. 29, 1987.
46 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(1).
47 Id. § 2403(a)(2).
48 Id. § 2403(a)(3).
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ogy.49 The control list includes all commodities subject to Commerce Department export controls. 50 It does not include arms,
ammunition, and other military items whose export is exclusively
controlled by the Department of State. 5 1 The list encompasses socalled dual use technology; that is, technology which has both civilian and military applications. 52 In reviewing the control of any item,
the following factors usually are considered: its essential features including the level of its technical sophistication, civilian uses, military
and military-support uses, end use pattern in the United States, and
foreign availability. 5 3 Exports are grouped into ten general categories; 54 within these general categories, entries on the list define the
commodities controlled to the specific country groups and
55
destinations.
For export control purposes, foreign countries are separated in
the federal regulations into seven country groups designated by the
symbols "O:', "S", "T",6"V", "W","Y",and "Z"1.56 The controlled

countries generally are either communist, associated with international terrorism, or engaged in human rights violations. 5 7 Exports to
free world countries are controlled only to the extent necessary to
58
avoid the risk of transshipment to controlled destinations.
To prevent transshipment, authorization must be obtained from
the Commerce Department to reexport from one country to another
American goods or technology previously exported pursuant to a
validated license. 59 Significant criminal and administrative sanctions
60
may be imposed upon violators.
In 1985, several changes occurred in the Act when Congress
passed the Export Administration Amendments Act. 6 ' The amendments revised and extended the Export Administration Act through
1989.62 The amendments relaxed licensing procedures, 63 expedited
the review process for exports to COCOM nations, 64 clarified en49 Id. § 2403(b).
50 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(a) (1987).
51 Id. § 399.1(a). The arms control regulations are outlined at infra notes 80-102 and
accompanying text.
52 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(a).
53 Id. § 370.1(b)(3).
54 Id. § 399.1 (b).
55 Id. The list and accompanying interpretations is over one hundred printed pages
in length. Id. § 399.1-399.2 supp. I.
56 Id.
57 Id.

§ 370 supp. I.

58 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2).
59 15 C.F.R. § 374.1-.9.
60 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410.
61 Id. §§ 2401-2419.
62 Id. § 2419.
63 Id. § 2404(e).
64 Id. § 2409(o).
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forcement responsibilities, 65 strengthened congressional oversight, 6 6 stiffened penalties for firms or individuals evading or
attempting to evade export controls, 6 7 and strengthened contract
sanctity for domestic firms engaged in the delivery of goods
68
abroad.
The Export Administration Act is due to be extended in 1989.69

A number of changes in the Act, however, have been proposed in the
omnibus trade bill, H.R. 3. 70 Both the Senate and House versions of
the bill provide for easing re-export authorization, 7 1 liberalizing con72
trols on exports to Western countries and to COCOM members,
eliminating unilateral controls except for controls on goods or technology with no foreign availability,'73 and decontrolling components
or parts unless the product as a whole will make a significant contri4
bution to the military potential of a controlled country.'
The House version establishes a goal of reducing the control list
forty percent over the next three years,'7 5 limits Pentagon review of

licenses to exports to controlled countries only,'76 requires the Secre77
tary of Commerce to conduct quarterly reviews of the control list,

and establishes a Presidential Commission on export control reform. 78 The Senate version provides for sanctions against Toshiba

Machine Company, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik Trading Company, and
any other firm or individual participating in a diversion of nationalsecurity sensitive goods and technology to the Soviet Union in viola79
tion of export controls established by COCOM.

III. Arms Export Control Act
The control of inherently military items falls under the umbrella
of the Arms Export Control Act.8 0 The Act permits the President
65 Id. § 2411.
66 Id. § 2405(1).
67 Id. § 2410.
68 Id. § 2405(m).
69 Id. § 2419. The termination date of the current version is September 30, 1989.
70 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2981 (1987) (passed House on
Apr. 30, 1987); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 10,372 (1987) (passed
Senate as amended on July 21, 1987).
7' H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1006 (Senate version); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 332(c) (House version).
72 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1004-1005 (Senate version); H.R. 3, 100th
Con, Ist Sess. 332(d) (House version).
H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1009 (Senate version); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
332(f) (House version).
74 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1016 (Senate version); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 332(m) (House version).
75 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332(f).
76 Id. § 332(n). See supra note 42.
77 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332(e).
78 Id. § 339.
79 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1029-1033.
80 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).

Sess.
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"to control the import and export of defense articles and defense
services." 8' The Act authorizes the President to designate items
which shall be deemed defense articles and defense services.8 2 Such
items constitute the United States Munitions List.8 3 The President

84
has delegated his export control authority to the Secretary of State.
Within the State Department, the controls are administered by the
85
Office of Munitions Control (OMC).

Manufacturers and exporters of defense articles or defense services must register with OMC.8 6 Licenses for the export of most de-

87
fense articles must be obtained from OMC prior to export. OMC
may require that the applicant be a United States citizen, national, or
permanent resident.8 8 Exporters must ascertain the specific enduser and end-use of the defense article.8 9 A statement explaining the
prohibition against diversion or transshipment of the article beyond
the end-user is an integral component of the shipper's export declaration, bill of lading, and invoice. 90
In 1985, the Department of State overhauled the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 9 l issued under the authority of

the Act. 9 2 Although the basic regulatory scheme was not affected by

the revisions, the changes eliminated confusion over the relation of
the ITAR to the export regulations administered by the Commerce
Department, explained how defense articles and defense services are
placed on the Munitions List, provided more guidance to applicants
on how to apply for licenses, and improved the enforcement of the
93
regulations.
81 Id. § 2778(a)(1).
82 Id. "Designations of defense articles and defense services are based primarily on
whether an article or service is deemed to be inherently military in character." 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.3 (1987).
83 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The United States Munitions List is enumerated in the
Code of Federal Regulations. 22 C.F.R. § 121. It includes twenty specifically enumerated
categories of controlled items. Id. § 121.1. The list is followed by interpretations explaining and amplifying its terms. Id. § 121.2-.15.
84 Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977), amended by Exec. Order No.
12,118, 44 Fed. Reg. 7939 (1979), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982).
85 22 C.F.R. § 120.1.
86 Id. § 122.1.
87 Id. § 123.1(a).
88 Id.§ 123.1(b).
89 Id.§ 123.9(a).
90 The mandatory statement is contained in 22 C.F.R. § 123.9:
These commodities are authorized by the U.S. Government for export only
to (country of ultimate destination). They may not be resold, diverted, transferred, transhipped, or otherwise be disposed of in any other country, either
in their original form or after being incorporated through an intermediate
process into other end-items, without the prior written approval of the U.S.
Department of State.
91 The ITAR applies to items "deemed to be inherently military in character." Id.

§ 120.3.
92 49 Fed. Reg. 47,682 (1984).
93 Id.
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Office of Munitions Control licenses currently are denied for the
export of defense articles and defense services destined for communist countries. 9 4 This restriction applies as well to nations with
which the United States maintains an arms embargo or "whenever an
export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the
security and foreign policy of the United States." 95 The government
prohibits as well the export of items to countries supporting international terrorism.9 6 The Secretary of State has designated Libya,
Syria, Iran, Cuba and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen) as countries that repeatedly have provided support
for international terrorism. 97 Substantial criminal and civil penalties
may be imposed for violations of the Act including imprisonment, 98
criminal fines, 99 debarment,' 020 seizure and forfeiture of illegal ex10
ports, 0 1 and civil penalties.
Problems with Export Control Administration

IV.

Despite these elaborate regulations of strategic exports to prohibited countries, controlled exports have frequently found their way
abroad in violation of U.S. export policy either through administrative error, the machination of private exporters, or both. The Congress repeatedly has grappled with many cases where export controls
have failed to prevent diversions to Soviet bloc nations and countries
03
engaged in or supporting international terrorism.'
94 22 C.F.R. § 126.1.
9
5 Id.
96

See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1);
No. 149, ECONOMIC

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPE-

SANCTIONS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 4
(1986) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT No. 149]. The Arms Export Control Act requires the
President to terminate all direct government-to-government military sales to any nation
which aids or abets international terrorism by granting sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which commits an act of international terrorism, unless national security considerations require otherwise. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(f).
97 SPECIAL REPORT No. 149, supra note 96, at 3.
98 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) provides that individuals convicted under the Arms Export
Control Act may be imprisoned for as much as ten years for each violation.
99 The law permits the imposition of a fine of as much as one million dollars for each
violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Id.
100 22 C.F.R. § 127.6.
101 Id. § 127.5.
102 The civil penalties may not exceed $500,000 for each violation. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(e); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (Supp. Ill1985); 22 C.F.R. § 127.9.
103 See Transfer of Technology and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigationsof the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 35-377 (1978); Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and
Soviet Bloc Nations: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, supra note 18; Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing & UrbanAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-14 (1983); Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance & Monetary
Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & UrbanAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-114 (1983);
MRI/Mueller: Vax Case, Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 7; Transfer of Technology: Hearings
CIAL REPORT
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Each time the complaints have been the same-the loss of strategic goods and technology to restricted nations-and each time the
answers have been the same-programs have been instituted to correct the deficiencies in the controls.' 0 4 The concern is understandable in light of the considerable harm that may be incurred by the
United States when Western goods and technology are acquired by
0
restricted countries.1

5

In recent years Congress has expressed increasing alarm at the
disarray in the export control program in the face of a systematic
effort by restricted countries to obtain U.S. goods and technology.
Most of that concern has been directed at licensing and enforcement
responsibilities housed in the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Act. The Department of State's record in controlling the export of exclusively military items, under the Arms
Export Control Act, has been evaluated sparingly. 10 6 Under that
Act, licensing decisions are made by the State Department 10 7 and the
enforcement responsibilities rest with the Customs Service.' 0 8
Such decisions are comparatively easy to make when one is dealing with the obvious risks presented by weaponry, and no significant
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 98-986 (1984).
104 The utter frustration of Congress was expressed by SenatorJake Garn, then Chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee: "This review is becoming an annual exercise. Unfortunately, the problems persist and we continually are
found examining serious instances where our control effort has failed. We were told first
that there was no enforcement problem. Then we were told that the Commerce Department was beefing up its efforts to put an end to the problem." MRI/Mueller: Vax Case,
Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 7, at 1.
105 American intelligence sources argue that the Soviets acquire Western technology
primarily for military purposes and, in the process, save hundreds of millions of dollars in
research and development costs, modernize their military industry, limit production costs
and improve their weapons performances. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET AcQuiSMON OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY (1982), reprinted in Transfer of United States High Technology
to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 18, at 7-23. Moreover, these
Soviet acquisitions present additional problems for the Western military strategy:
The United States and its Allies traditionally have relied on the technological
superiority of their weapons to preserve a credible counterforce to the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact. But that technical superiority is eroding as the Soviet Union and its Allies introduce more and more sophisticated
weaponry-weapons that all too often are manufactured with the direct help
of Western technology.
Id. at 9.
The cost of terrorist countries obtaining military equipment and technology is just as
disturbing. "From 1973 through 1985, more than 6,500 terrorist incidents, including 150
lethal attacks against U.S. citizens accounting for 405 deaths, were recorded worldwide."
Garrett, Terrorism and the Use of Military Force, DEFENSE, May-June 1987, at 26.
106 See Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations:
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, supra note 18, at 163-65.
107 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (1987).
108 Id. § 127.4.
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systemic problems have been detected with licensing and enforcement under the Arms Export Control Act. 10 9 The same, however,
cannot be said of the Export Administration Act. The State Department's and the Customs Service's job is a good deal less problematic
than that of the Commerce Department. For one thing, Commerce
must execute a policy from between the conflicting priorities of controlling strategic exports and encouraging U.S. foreign trade, while
State's restrictive function is easier to conceptualize and therefore to
execute. Furthermore, implementation of export controls on military hardware involves none of the complex fact determinations and
close exercises of judgment required in Commerce's regulation of
dual-use exports.
Even allowing for the difficulty of its task, the Commerce Department's handling of the Export Administration Act has left much
to be desired. In the past decade, the Senate has conducted several
hearings on the illegal diversion of strategic exports to the Soviet
Union."10 The first inquiry arose after the Commerce Department
licensed the transfer of certain key American technology to the Soviet Union by Dresser Industries of Dallas, Texas-one of the nation's leading manufacturers of oil well drilling equipment."' The
committee scrutinized the enforcement controls in the Commerce
Department, and in its report highlighted the testimony of a Commerce Department investigator. The investigator conceded that the
KGB could not have organized enforcement functions within the De1 12
partment in a way more beneficial to Soviet interests.
A few years later, in 1982, the Senate held in-depth hearings on
the loss of technology to Soviet bloc countries. 1 3 A number of Sen109 A Commerce Department official contended that those problems have been
avoided in the State Department because of the smaller size of the munitions list and the
ability of the United States Government to control as well who produces the weapons.
Transfer of Technology: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 103, at 127 (statement of William T. Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, Commerce Department).
I10 See sources cited supra notes 18, 103. Actually, the Senate has been concerned
about the loss of technology to the Soviet Union since at least 1951. In a report issued
after hearings that year, the Senate Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce noted
that "[a] matter of grave and constant concern to the United States is the extent to which
materials of critical or strategic nature flow from the west to those countries behind the
Communist iron curtain which seek the eventual destruction of the western way of life." S.
REP No. 944, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951).
111 Transfer of Technology and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note
103, at 2. The export actions examined involved two applications. "One covered technical data for use in a $144 million 'turnkey' project to construct a plant to manufacture high
quality oil drilling rock bits. The other application covered a computer controlled electron
beam welder to be used in manufacturing the rock bits." Id. In a study made by the
Defense Science Board, (Bucy Report) the Board concluded that the export involved technology and equipment easily diverted to military use. Id. at 3.
112 S. REP. No. 664, supra note 33, at 36.
'13
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ators used the opportunity to air their concerns about the capacity of
4
the Commerce Department to effectively enforce export controls." 1
The Commerce Department promised the Senate it would adopt a
new policy focused on tightening export controls." t 5 Nevertheless,
the following year Congress was examining the problem again-this
time referring to it as a "hemorrhage of strategic goods to our adversaries." 1' 6 The hearings were called this time to review the Commerce Department's fulfillment of its responsibilities to control
exports in light of pending legislation for extending the Export Administration Act." t 7 Senators reviewed findings of the Inspector
General of the Commerce Department, which were highly critical of
8
the Department's performance."
A recurring issue in the hearings was concern over divided loyalties within the Commerce Department" t9 due to that department's
having responsibility both to promote and to control exports.' 20
ings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
supra note 18.
114 For instance, Senator Nunn (D-Ga.) noted that, from as early as 1963, the Commerce Department was undermanned and undertrained as a law enforcement organization, while the Soviets were becoming increasingly adept in the successful acquisition of
American technology. Id. at 4-5 (statement of Senator Sam Nunn). Senator Chiles (DFla.) likewise expressed concern over the Department's problems in enforcing export controls. Id. at 26 (statement of Senator Lawton Chiles).
115 Indeed, a Commerce Department official bragged to the Senate Committee about
recent organizational realignments and adjustments, including the establishment of a new
export enforcement organization under the direction of a former federal prosecutor experienced in export diversion cases, evidencing the Commerce Department's commitment
to enhancing enforcement efforts. Id. at 266-67 (statement of LawrenceJ. Brady, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration, Commerce Department).
116 Export Administration Act: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, supra note 103, at 3.
117 Id. at 1.
118 Senator Cohen summarized the Inspector General's report:
It is clear that the Department's failure to provide adequate resources, policy
guidance, and management direction has impeded the compliance effort and
produced, at the very least, the perception of a de facto supremacy of trade
promotion over the Department's export control functions. What is also
clear from the findings in this report is that the Department of Commerce
has not taken a bold lead in forging an aggressive multiagency effort to halt
the illicit export of controlled products.
Id. at 6 (statement of Senator William Cohen). The complete Inspector General's Report
may be found in Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc
Nations: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 18, at 607-37.
119 This was not the first time Congress had addressed this problem. In a Senate report issued the previous year, the staff found that "[t]he Commerce Department has as its
major focus the promotion of trade and is not comfortable with the task of limiting the sale
of anything, whether it is dual-use technology or some other commodity." S. REP. No.
664, supra note 33, at 37.
120 One committee witness, with over 26 years experience in the export control area of
Commerce, noted the good relations the Export Licensing Division and the Office of International Trade had with the business community. Export Administration Act: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 103, at 121 (statement
of Theodore L. Thau, Retired Commerce Department Official). He observed that, in contrast, Commerce officials involved in export control "generally are always at risk that their
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Many argued that Commerce cannot be charged on the one hand
with promoting exports and, on the other hand, with controlling
them. 12 1 One witness, with twenty-six years experience in the Commerce Department, testified that the conflict was unsolvable, so long
22
as both functions remained in the same department.
12 3
Over the next few months, the Senate continued to review

the pervasive Soviet evasion of export controls through diversion,
transfer, reexport, and the creation of dummy companies in Western
Europe.12 4 Although the Commerce Department assured the Congress that it had made great strides in improving its licensing and
26
enforcement capabilities, 125 many senators remained skeptical.1
V.

Case Histories of Ineffective Export Controls
A. VAX Computers

Numerous failures of the export administration system since the
1982 hearings have served to confirm this senatorial skepticism. The
following year, in fact, the Senate held hearings to investigate the
attempted diversion to the Soviet Union of sophisticated VAX
11/782 computers and large amounts of additional high tech equipdecisions may have to be unpleasant to businessmen .... Removing commodities from
licensing restrictions is pleasant. But when licenses must be denied, when commodities
must be controlled, or when a businessman must be charged with violating controls, then
the work of the export control official is negative and unpleasant, to himself, and to everyone else in the Department who has the pleasant duties I have described." Id.
121 Id. at 5, 18, 92 & 116.
122 Id. at 116 (testimony of Theodore L. Thau).
123 Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Finance & Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 103.
124 Id. at 172 (statement of William Schneider, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Department of State).
125 Id. at 168-69. Commerce officials cited the creation of a separate Office of Export
Enforcement, an increased enforcement budget, the hiring of 35 criminal investigators
and intelligence specialists, the opening of new enforcement field offices, the development
of memoranda of agreement with other agencies on the sharing of information and the use
of public presentations designed to encourage private sector compliance with export controls. Id.at 168-69.
126 Four years later, the Senate was still arguing with the Commerce Department
about their failure to comply with reforms mandated by the 1985 amendments to the Export Administration Act relating to Commerce's administration of the Act. In a hearing
with then-Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, Senator Proxmire expressed his
continued frustration:
In 1983 and 1984, Senator Garn and I believed that the Commerce Department should not manage our export licensing program because of the inherent conflict there between trade promotion and export administration. To
lessen that conflict, the 1985 act mandated that Commerce create a new
Under Secretary for Export Administration so that function had higher visibility and could command more resources and respect. Commerce has resisted establishing such a position. I, for one, will not go along with any
further delays in implementing that Congressional mandate.
Export Controls: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 100-107, at 17 (statement of Senator William Proxmire) (1987).
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ment.' 2 7 The Commerce Department was accused of, 1 28 and admitted, 12 9 making numerous mistakes with respect to the licensing and
investigation of the case. The errors included inadequately disseminating and analyzing sensitive intelligence, a lengthy delay in starting
an investigation of the suspects, failure to cross-reference files on
different suspects, and ignoring other obvious signs of possible
30
diversion.1
The chronology of events in the VAX case demonstrates inherent
problems with the present export control enforcement system.' 3 '
The Commerce Department received information in May 1980 linking Richard Mueller, a fugitive under indictment in California for export violations, with a foreign firm, MRI, an end-user on several
validated export licenses from the United States. Mueller was interested in purchasing, through MRI, American semiconductor manufacturing systems for resale to the Soviet Union.
Between the time Commerce received this information and July
5, 1983, Commerce approved sixteen export licenses in favor of MRI
as the approved end-user,13 2 one just three days after this negative
information was received. Commerce conducted no investigation
before issuing the licenses beyond arranging an interview regarding
the allegations with a MRI official overseas. When the interview,
conducted by an inexperienced foreign commercial service official,
resulted in a denial by MRI of any wrongdoing on its part, the Commerce Department terminated their inquiry without further action. 3 3 On November 22, 1982, another source reported suspicious
conduct by MRI to the Commerce Department. This time MRI had
purchased equipment without requesting installation or inspection
as specified in the sales contract and included in the purchase price.
Moreover, contrary to normal practice, MRI had failed to order warranty replacement parts.
Despite this additional information, Commerce subsequently licensed the export to MRI of two sensitive VAX computers, inte127 MRI/Mueller: Pax Case, Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 7.
128 Id. at 63-73.
129 Id. at 15-16 (testimony of William T. Archey, Acting Assistant Secretary for Trade

Administration, Commerce Department),
130

Id. at 15.

131 The chronology is taken from the testimony of Warren Rudman, Director of Strategic Investigations, U.S. Customs Service. Id.at 63-65.
132 Transfer of Technology and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before

the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note
103, at 71 (statement ofJohn M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Enforcement & Operations, Department of the Treasury).
133 MRI/Mueller: Vax Case, Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 7, at 64 (statement of Senator Warren Rudman).
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grated circuits, and an ion implanting system.' 3 4 Commerce waited
several months, until March 24, 1983, to request onsite overseas inspection of MRI's facility. In another interview with the MRI official,
he finally admitted that his firm had engaged in illegal conduct. This
admission was relayed to the Commerce Department on June 27,
1983, along with a recommendation to deny the firm and this individual further export privileges. Nevertheless, the following month,
the Commerce Department proceeded to license the export of another VAX computer to MRI before rescinding the license, however,
later that month. Commerce took no further action on the case until
November 1983, when it learned that the Customs Service was investigating MRI and Mueller.' 3 5 Commerce and Customs then embroiled themselves in a dispute over control of the investigation.
This disagreement was serious enough to require mediation by the
Administration, and full cooperation in the investigation by Com13 6
merce was not forthcoming for some time.
The hearings over the VAX case again raised the issue of a proexport bias in the Commerce Department; the Senate Committee
Chairman piqued that if Commerce had their way, they would sell
37
everything because doing so would create additional employment. 1
Commerce Department officials again assured Congress that the VAX
case was an isolated historical event, now solved by institutional
134 Two years earlier the Defense Department had warned the Commerce Department
that the VAX computer system was a target of the Soviet Union. Id. at 34 (statement of
Stephen D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Int'l Economic, Trade & Security Policy). At the time the license was approved, this equipment represented state-of-theart computer hardware capable of supporting and accelerating Soviet military modernization programs.
The computer system had a complete configuration identical to a number of
highly classified U.S. defense systems ....
Among the tasks that this particular system could carry out include the simulation of the operation of military
systems, such as missile targeting, at faster than real-time, or the time it takes
for a missile to hit its target; the simulation of terrain-following radar for
cruise missiles and flight paths of intercontinental ballistic missiles; and command and control for targeting antiaircraft batteries of guns and missiles;
and the design and manufacture of very highspeed integrated circuits. This
application, essential for the manufacture of smart weapons, is totally embargoed to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Id. at 32.
135 The Committee Chairman was incensed over the Department's lack of initiative in
dealing with the MRI problem: "Doesn't anybody stay after work? Does anybody pick up a
phone or do you just put it in a pouch and that takes care of your duties for the day?... Is
there anybody in our Government that says, 'Hell, this is important,' and maybe makes a
call himself?" Id. at 65-66 (statement of Senator Jake Garn).
136 Id. at 70-73 (statement of William Rudman, Director, Strategic Investigations Division, U.S. Customs Service). The bureaucratic bickering between Commerce and Customs
has been a longstanding problem. Senator Proxmire has noted the obvious: each has a
role in administering our export control program and wants to guard its own turf. Id. at 3
(statement of Senator William Proxmire). The administration has attempted to solve this
complex problem through a memorandum of understanding, delineating the respective
responsibilities of each agency. 50 Fed. Reg. 41,545 (1985).
137 Id. at 53 (statement of SenatorJake Garn).
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changes taken to improve the Department's enforcement program.1 38 Although many of the MRI exports were recovered by Customs Service, the Soviet Union received enough technology to save
$80 million a year for a decade in research and development
CoStS.139

B.

United States v. McTavish and United States v. Elkins.

Of course, the Soviet Union is not the only restricted nation circumventing United States export controls. The Commerce Department's annual report dealing with export administration reveals how
widespread these trade violations are, 140 and the systemic nature of
the problem is demonstrated forcibly by two recent cases of significant diversions of strategic items. 1 4 ' The cases, United States v. McTavish 142 and United States v. Elkins,143 concerned a tangled web of
diversions to Iran and Libya, countries engaged in international
terrorism.

144

McTavish involved exports and attempted exports of controlled
items to Iran and Chile from 1982 until 1985,145 including gyroscopes for the inertial navigation system of the F-4 Phantom combat
aircraft, gas masks for use in chemical warfare, and spare parts for
the C-130 and L-100 cargo aircrafts. 14 6 The scheme entailed exports
from the United States to an alleged end-user in Hong Kong. The
items subsequently were diverted to Iran and Chile.14 7 The exports
required validated licenses from either the State Department or the
Commerce Department depending upon their military or civilian application.' 48 The perpetrators accomplished the diversions by concealing the identity of the true end-user and misdescribing the
exports. 149
138 Transfer of Technology and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note

103, at 77 (testimony of William T. Archey).
139 Id. at 33 (statement of Stephen D. Bryen).
140 Each year the Commerce Department reports detected violations in the Export
Administration Annual Report. Their most recent report, issued on October 23, 1985, for
fiscal year 1984 indicated 51 cases were referred to the Department ofJustice for possible
criminal prosecution. 1984 U.S. DEP'T COM., EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. 61.

141 The author investigated and indicted both of these cases before leaving the Department ofJustice. Care has been taken to limit disclosure to information already in the
public domain.
142 No. 85-226A (N.D. Ga. indicted June 13, 1985, convicted Jan. 17, 1986), aff'd, No.
86-8343 (Feb. 17, 1987).
143 No. 86-267A (N.D. Ga. indicted July 22, 1986, convicted June 5, 1987).
144 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
145 Chile's record on human rights and international terrorism has concerned the
United States. Therefore, the International Security and Development Act of 1981 placed
restrictions on exports to Chile. Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 726(b), 95 Stat. 1554 (1981).
146 McTavish, indictment at 7-13.
147 Id. at 5-13.
148 Id. at 13-19.
149 Id. at 6.
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Although Hong Kong is a known entrept for smuggling strategic
items from the United States to Iran,' 5 0 these export licenses were
routinely approved by the Commerce Department. 15 1 Indeed the
three-continent conspiracy was detected only by some rather innovative investigative techniques used by the Customs Service. 152 The
Commerce Department was unaware of an international operation
and the rethat would eventually lead to a twenty count indictment
53
covery of approximately $2.5 million worth of goods.'
Elkins presents an even more disturbing example of how easy it
is to evade export controls. Elkins involved the diversion of two
Lockheed L-100-30 aircraft and spare parts from the United States to
Libya.' 54 According to the indictment, the exports were part of a
conspiracy by the Libyan Armed Forces, not only to acquire these
enormous aircraft capable of carrying troops and military cargo, but
to subsequently convert them into aircraft capable of aerial refueling
of Libyan fighterjets.1 55 The aerial refueling systems were to be obtained by Libya from a California firm.1 5 6
The details of the Elkins case belie previous claims by the Commerce Department regarding its improved licensing and enforcement controls.' 5 7 For example, the Commerce Department's own
regulations restrict the sale of such aircraft to Libya or Libyan nationals. 158 The Elkins defendants filed license applications with the
150 Karniol, Iran's Hong Kong Connection, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF. May 1986, at 42.
The visible edge of this trade is not substantial in terms of value: it was worth
roughly $10 million in 1984 and $6.6 million in 1985. However, these
figures reflect only those goods which were landed in the British colony and
thus fully documented. Transshipments-that is, goods which transit
through Hong Kong and are seldom checked by the authorities-are not recorded. But a U.S. intelligence source says there are 'indications' that a further volume of strategic materials bound for Iran passes through the territory
in this manner.
Id.

15I McTavish, indictment at 5-13.
152 The Customs Special Agent on the case, Joseph R. Webber, developed a significant portion of the case by regularly sifting through a trash dumpster, at three o'clock in
the morning, located behind the U.S. exporter's establishment. Hooper, We Talk Trash,
CUSTOMs TODAY, Spring 1987, at 2.

153 Evidence was introduced at the trial that the American and Hong Kong coconspirators also were trafficking in stolen U.S. military aircraft parts, which they attempted to sell
to Libya. Id.
154 Elkins, indictment at 9-10.
155 Id. at 18-19.
156 Id. at 18.
157 MRI/Mueler: Vax Case, Enforcement of the Export Control Enforcement Act: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 7, at 6-10 (statement of
William T. Archey, Acting Assislant Secretary for Trade Administration, Department of
Commerce).
158 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(d) provides in pertinent part: "This control indicates ... aircraft
Applications will
that will be exported or reexported to Libya or Libyan nationals ....
generally be denied for exports that would constitute a high risk of increasing Libyan capabilities to carry military cargo or troops or to conduct military reconnaissance or observation missions." The C-130 (military version of the L-100-30) is a highly valued plane
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Commerce Department indicating the aircraft and spare parts were
being purchased by a West German firm, Contrust GMBH, ostensibly for oil exploration in Benin, a remote African nation. 159 The $57
million export was approved by the Commerce Department despite
disclosure by Lockheed-Georgia that Libyan nationals ran the West
German firm.'

60

At the time the license was approved, the Com-

merce Department also knew the defendants previously had sought
to purchase the C-130 military cargo aircraft, ostensibly on behalf of
the government of Bolivia. 16 1 That deal collapsed when Lockheed16 2
Georgia discovered no one in Bolivia knew the defendants.
The admission alone that the aircraft were going to be exported
to Benin should have raised some suspicion at the Department of
Commerce. Benin is an avowedly Marxist state which has close ties
with the Soviet Union.' 6 3 Since 1972, its political structure has centered around a group of left-wing military officers, operating under a
National Revolutionary Assembly. 164 In 1984, a Defense Department publication indicated the presence of Soviet military personnel
in Benin. 165 Moreover, Libyan Revolutionary Leader Colonel Ghaddafi visited Benin in 1983.166 Despite all this available information
linking the aircraft sale to Libya, the transaction was approved appar16 7
ently without suspicion by the Department of Commerce.
C.

IBM/Transnautic

The most recently disclosed export control blunder by the Commerce Department has enabled a Soviet-owned company in West
Germany to obtain technology Defense Department experts claim
which Libya has been trying to acquire since 1973. O'Shea, Lockheed Plane in Libya Plot Has
a World-Class Reputation, At. Const., July 24, 1986, at 7A, col. 6. The differences between
the C-130 and the L-100-30 are minimal. Elkins, indictment at 15.
159 Elkins, indictment at 10.
160 Thurston, Libya Plotfor Planes Unmasked, Ad. Const., July 24, 1986, at 7A, col. 4. In
the article a Lockheed-Georgia spokesman said the company passed its files of the defendants and their company on to the Commerce Department during the license application
review.
161 Thurston, supra note 160.
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 1, col. 3; Elkins, indictment at 15.
C. PHILLIPS, AFRICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 75-76 (1984).
Benin: General Data & Government, in KALEIDOSCOPE CURRENT WORLD DATA 5 (1987).
1984 U.S. DEP'T DEF., SOVIET MIL. POWER 114-15.
Benin: Chronology, in KALEIDOSCOPE CURRENT WORLD DATA 2 (1985). Since the ex-

port, Libya and Benin have been linked together in a plot to blow up an overseas U.S.
Embassy. African Nation Foils Plot to Blow Up U.S. Embassy, Atl. Const., Aug. 12, 1986, at 3A,
col. 3.
167 Elkins, indictment at 19. For further background on the Elkins case, see Lachica,
U.S. Accuses Seven of Plot to Export Aircraft to Libya, Wall St. J., July 24, 1986, at 8, col. 1;
Treadwell & Ostrow, 7 Indicted in $50-Million Sale of Transport Aircraft to Libya, L.A. Times,
July 24, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Corwin, Chance Talk Led to Sale of Planes to Libya, U.S. Reveals, L.A.
Times, July 27, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Harvey, Trial Turns on Whether Four Knew Libya Was Real
Buyer of Lockheed Planes, Ati. Const., Apr. 24, 1987, at 2A, col. 1; Thompson, 1 of 3 Convicted
of Conspiracy in Libya Sale, At. Const., June 6, 1987, at 1, col 1.
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poses a threat to American national security.' 6 8 Although government officials are divided over whether national security was compromised, there is no dispute that the Commerce Department's
licensing and enforcement units made another very serious
mistake.16 9
The facts of the case are not in dispute. In September 1986,
I.B.M. Germany 170 approached the Commerce Department for a license to sell a Model 4381 mainframe computer' 7' to Transnautic, a
German company controlled by a Soviet state-controlled company.172 The Defense Department recommended that the license be
denied, and for several months all indications pointed to a concurrence by the Commerce Department. Nevertheless, on June 10,
1987, unbeknownst to the Pentagon, the Commerce Department
unilaterally granted the license after adding some monitoring con173
trols to try to allay national security concerns.
When I.B.M. officials informed Transnautic that the license finally had been approved, they discovered that Transnautic already
had purchased an I.B.M. compatible AS-8043 mainframe from a
competitor. 174 This second license application was routinely approved by the Commerce Department, even while the dispute with
I.B.M. was pending. The only difference: the second license applica175
tion did not disclose Transnautic as a Soviet-controlled company.
The Commerce Department has failed to explain why Transnautic was not listed in their control system as a Soviet-controlled
company or why none of their licensing or enforcement officials noticed the omission in the second license application. Commerce's
failure to cross-reference license applications by name of exporter
and of foreign importer creates the possibility that a foreign government might use the Department procedures in bad faith. This might
be done by submitting several applications for the same export, with
each application offering different information, in hopes that one of
the requests will be approved. Moreover, if this case suggests that
the Commerce Department depends solely upon the honesty and
168 Rasky & Sanger, U.S. Split Over Computer Sale to a Soviet-Owned Co., N.Y. Times, Sept.

29, 1987, at 1,col. 1.
169 Pentagon officials have gone so far as to accuse the Commerce Department of "deliberate deception" in this case. Id. at D6, col. 6.
170 I.B.M. Germany is a subsidiary of International Business Machines Corporation.
Id. at D6, col. 2.
171 Although the computer does not represent new technology, it is one of the more
powerful computers manufactured by I.B.M. The computer is several times more powerful than the type COCOM authorizes for sale to the Soviet Union. Id. at D6, col. 1-2 (statement of Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary, Department of Defense).
172 "Transnautic, a Hamburg-based shipping company, is 51 percent owned by Sovfracht, a Soviet state-controlled company." Id. at D6, col. 2.
173 Id. at D6, col. 5.
174 Id. at D6, col. 5-6.
175 Id. at D6, col. 6.
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good faith of the exporter to disclose links with prohibited countries,
one can only ponder how many other illegal exports go completely
undetected.

VI.

1 76

Possible Solutions

The foregoing cases demonstrate that the administration of export controls is laden with serious problems. The breakdowns in the
system can no longer be ignored if the United States intends to curb
illegal exports to restricted nations. Despite the natural tendencies
of politics to avoid difficult and controversial issues, problems in the
administration of export controls compel appropriate legislation.
The following suggestions seem to the author to be promising reforms of export administration.
A.

Licensing

At the outset, the cumbersome licensing system needs to be centralized in one agency, its sole charge to make decisions on the export of commercial and military items and technology of strategic
significance. Licensing decisions presently are divided between the
Commerce Department and the State Department, with review by
the Defense Department as well. This has led to dilution of expertise, conflicts over shared responsibilities, and duplication of investigative efforts. Moreover, the list of controlled items has burgeoned
in recent years and there is no viable process for removing goods
177
and technology that no longer are strategic to national security.
To be effective from a national security standpoint, export controls
should regulate only those products that are likely to create the
178
greatest threat should they fall into enemy hands.
Directly addressing shortcomings in licensing, Senator Garn
proposed, in 1983, the establishment of a separate Office of Strategic
Trade for the purpose of consolidating the licensing of export controls into one agency.' 79 His proposal would eliminate the licensing
function of the Commerce and State Departments.' 8 " He argued
176 Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary, Department of Defense, has admitted that this mistake was discovered "almost accidentally."

Once again, the Commerce Department has

assured critics that it is modifying procedures to prevent repetition of the incident. Id. at
D6, col. 1.
177 NAT'L ACAD. Sci., supra note

5,

at

13.

178 130 CONG. REC. S2142 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
Nunn argued that "[w]ith improved intelligence as to what specific technologies the Soviets are most in need of, U.S. officials should be able to shorten the list significantly. Instead of doing an inadequate job controlling too many products, American policy should

be revised by seeking to control only those products which, from a national defense point
of view, are likely to pose the greatest threat to us should they fall into the hands of an
adversary." Id..
179 S. 434, 98thCong., 1st Sess. (1983). Enforcement responsibility would have been
transferred
to this office as well. Id.
180 Id § 5.
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that it is essential to place the administration of export control in a
highly visible federal agency whose only purpose is export
8
control. ' '

Certainly, a positive component of the proposal would be the
elimination of the conflict of interest between export promotion and
export control in the Commerce Department. 8 2 The streamlining
of licensing review into one agency would make the elimination of
nonstrategic commodities on either the Munitions or CCL lists more
attainable, since the proposal vested all licensing decisions in one
agency.
Garn's initiative received considerable support in the Senate.
Eighteen Senators supported the idea from its inception, and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs issued a report
finding considerable merit in the proposal.' 8 3 Indeed, the entire
Senate passed legislation requiring the President to submit a proposal for the creation of an Office of Strategic Trade. 8 4
The independent agency concept, however, was not included in
the 1985 amendments to the Export Administration Act ultimately
enacted. 8 5 Successful opposition to the proposal came from the Department of Commerce and its supporters in the House of Representatives who argued that the existing licensing arrangement,
shared between Commerce, State, and Defense, was necessary to ensure that differing viewpoints on the export question received
86
consideration. 1

Continuous breakdowns in the licensing function by the Commerce Department undermine the arguments made against a single
independent agency. The Department's recent track record is the
strongest justification for reconsidering the proposal and removing
the export licensing from an organization institutionally incapable of
performing that task. Licensing should be controlled by an in181 Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int '
Finance & Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & UrbanAffairs, supra note 103, at

717-18 (statement of Senator Jake Garn). "There is little consensus on export control in
this administration, nor is there likely to be much in any administration as long as our
system is bureaucratically deemphasized and top policy is made on an ad hoc basis by
individuals, not one of which has a day-to-day single purpose responsibility for and experience in export administration." Id. at 717.
182 Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban

Affairs, supra note 103, at 5 (statement of Senator William Cohen).
183 S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
184 S. 979, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15, 130 CONG. REC. 2143 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
For the full text of S. 979, see 130 CONG. REC. 2252 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1984).
185 See supra note 41.
186 H.R. REP. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1983). The House Report concluded
"that the only means of assuring that both economic and national security or foreign policy considerations are fully weighed in export control decisions is to involve fully and
equally the Departments charged with furthering these goals." Id.
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dependent agent capable of evaluating the delicate balance between
trade and export control.
B.

Enforcement: CongressionalHearings and the 1985 Amendments
to the Export Administration Act

Once licenses are issued, split responsibility between Customs
and Commerce causes even further problems. Enforcement operations are hindered by shared responsibility between the two. Dual
jurisdiction means increased costs of operation. The finite appropriation given to the enforcement function is divided between two policing organizations. Enforcement of export controls needs to rest
exclusively with the Customs Service.
Enforcement was one of the major issues Congress examined
during the many hearings held on export control. As early as 1983,
Senator Nunn proposed legislation to improve the enforcement of
export controls by placing all enforcement functions in the Customs
Service.' 8 7 That proposal also would have solved the counterproductive problem of interagency competition between Customs
and Commerce.18 8 Nunn justified placing the enforcement responsibility with Customs due to its institutional investigative experience
and Commerce's lack of expertise in that area.' 8 9
Nunn's proposal also received widespread support; legislation
passed the Senate the following year transferring enforcement authority to Customs.' 90 Support, however, did not endure for Nunn's
legislation and it was not included in the 1985 amendments to the
187 S. 407, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

188 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
189

Customs is a law enforcement agency with longstanding jurisdiction and experience in detecting, investigating, and apprehending criminal violators of
Federal Laws. The Commerce Department's experience and tradition in law
enforcement are, at best, limited and recently claimed. I believe there is no
question which agency should be directed to carry out enforcement of export
laws. Whether it is within a new Office of Strategic Trade or under an
amended Export Administration Act, the responsibility to investigate violations of the law should rest with the Customs Service.
Export AdministrationAct: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & UrbanAffairs,
supra note 103, at 29 (statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
190 S. 979, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). For a full description of the Senate bill, see
Senate Approves Tougher Curbs on Exports, 42 CONG. Q. 523 (1984). In committee hearings,
Senator Garn described the bill as "an extremely good proposal ... Customs has the
background and expertise and the mandate to enforce." Export AdministrationAct: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 103, at 25 (statement
of Chairman Jake Garn). The Committee's Minority staff agreed, finding, "effective enforcement of the Export Administration Act is beyond the institutional capabilities of the
Commerce Department." Id. at 41. Even industry leaders found merit in transferring the
enforcement function from the Commerce Department to the Customs Service.
Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance &
Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 103, at 297-98
(statement of James A. Gray, President, National Machine Tool Builder's Association).
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Export Administration Act. t9 1 Critics successfully argued that
changes in the Commerce Department's administration and jurisdic92
tion would solve the enforcement problem.'
The 1985 amendments sought to clarify the roles of the two
agencies with respect to export enforcement and were supplemented
by agency regulations setting forth the distribution of responsibilities between the two agencies. 19 3 Unfortunately, the changes have
created more problems than they have solved.
Both agencies remain involved with inspections and investigations of suspected export control violations. Although Customs now
has primary responsibility for enforcement and investigation at the
border and ports of entry or exit, Commerce is not excluded from
such activities.' 94 Moreover, within the United States, both agencies
may conduct investigations, jointly or independently; Commerce is
expected to focus its attention on the domestic circumvention of the
export licensing system. 19 5 Customs has responsibility for foreign
investigations, but here again Commerce is allowed to deal with foreign authorities on policy and operational matters related to licensing or administrative sanctions. 196
Commerce also may conduct prelicense checks and postshipment verification outside the United States.' 9 7 Such authority provides the Commerce Department with an opportunity to place many
investigations under this large umbrella. Under the rubric of a
prelicense check or a postshipment verification, Commerce is free
under the new law to conduct extensive foreign investigations.
If recurring enforcement deficiencies are to be overcome, Congress must recognize that a forty year record of ineptitude and gross
inefficiency on the part of the Commerce Department underscores
the systemic nature of the problem and the need for corrective action. 198 The Customs Service should enforce export controls without interference from the Commerce Department.
191 See supra note 41.
192 Export Administration Act.- HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban

Affairs, supra note 103, at 51-77 (statement of Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of International Trade, Department of Commerce).
193 50 Fed. Reg. 41,545 (1985).
194 Id. at 41,546.

195 Id. Interestingly, there really is no other significant domestic function in export
enforcement besides the investigation of licensing violations.
196 Id.
197 Id.

198 Senator Garn made this point very forcefully when he chastised a Commerce Department official at a 1983 Senate hearing:
You indicate that improvements are being made and further improvements
are planned, I commend you for that, but that's the same story I've heard
ever since I have been in the Senate. These complaints are as old as 1948.
On December 18, 1948 the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments issued a report in its hearings on the administration of export controls by the Commerce Department. In that report the committee
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VII. Conclusion
The persistent efforts of the Congress over the past several years
to examine and reform export controls are commendable. Unfortunately, the Garn and Nunn proposals, which would have had a positive impact, failed to receive the support of the Reagan
administration or pass both houses of Congress. 19 9 The
hodgepodge reforms of 1985 did not solve the problems of export
control administration. H.R. 3 also fails to address these two central
concerns. 20 0 Only if the United States centralizes export controls, by
placing licensing authority in an independent agency and enforcement responsibility in the Customs Service, can it successfully manage the export of strategic goods and technology to restricted
countries.

criticized gross inefficiency on the part of employees and noted the enforcement responsibility was taken lightly.
Export AdministrationAct: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs,
supra note 103, at 79 (statement of Senator Jake Garn).
199 As a strong Reagan supporter, Senator Garn was particularly disappointed with the
administration's refusal to support major reform:
Again, I am disappointed that the interadministration negotiation did not
result in an administration bill to establish an OST [Office of Strategic
Trade], a proposal submitted by 18 members of the Senate, many of whom
are the staunchest supporters of this administration. There is even wider
support for removing criminal enforcement from the Commerce Department, which we all must agree was never designed to be a law enforcement
agency. That proposal, too, Mr. Chairman, seems to have been rejected.
Reauthorizationof the Export AdministrationAct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance &
Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, supra note 103, at 718 (statement of Senator Jake Garn).
200 The Senate version calls, however, for the General Accounting Office to submit a
report to the Congress "concerning procedural improvements to ensure the efficient administration of export controls under the Export Administration Act of 1979 without adversely affecting the national security interests of the United States." H.R. 3, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1028 (1987). The House version provides for establishing a Presidential Commission to consider reforms in the administration of export controls to the President and
Congress. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 339.

